Maria: Birmingham Field Office

Source: US FBI

I joined the FBI in 2004. I was assigned to the Memphis Field Office in 2005 and later transferred to the Washington Field Office. I worked as a supervisory special agent within the Cyber Division at FBI Headquarters and then transferred to the Birmingham Field Office in 2019.

In Birmingham, I have worked as a Joint Terrorism Task Force coordinator, and I am now the supervisory special agent of the Child Exploitation and Human Trafficking Task Force and the North Alabama Safe Streets Task Force.

What drew you to the FBI? 

I began my law enforcement career working for the South Georgia Drug Task Force in 2000. I worked undercover for a short period of time before I joined the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) in 2001. While I thoroughly enjoyed my work with the GBI, I felt I needed to do my best to continue to help and protect communities on a larger scale and to hopefully make a greater impact.

I felt the FBI is where I belonged. I love my job, and after all these years, I continue to be passionate about the great work we all do in law enforcement. I truly believe we are a team, and, more importantly, we are a family. We work together, no matter what time of day or day of the week, to ensure our communities remain safe

Stefanie Roddy: New York Field Office

Source: US FBI

I have been with the FBI since 2005 and originally investigated counterterrorism matters in the FBI’s New York office. In 2016, I became a supervisor of one of FBI New York’s squads. In 2019, I became an assistant legal attaché for the FBI at the U.S. Embassy in London, acting as a liaison between the FBI and U.K. law enforcement partners.

Earlier this year, I was promoted to an assistant special agent in charge for the New York Joint Terrorism Task Force.

What drew you to the FBI?

I was in law school during the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, and I felt drawn to government service with a strong desire to join the counterterrorism mission. Since the FBI has the lead on terrorism, I applied to be a special agent. The FBI has provided me with an opportunity to do things I never would have thought to do and travel to places I never would have thought to go. It has given me purpose.

Share the thing you’re most proud of from your FBI career.

In the counterterrorism world, more times than you would like, you find yourself responding to attacks after they have occurred. These are the stories we see on national news.

However, there are the other times when you actually prevent an attack from occurring, and there is a tremendous feeling of pride whenever lives may have been saved. Early in my career, I was investigating a case where we identified people who were plotting to attack U.S. soldiers abroad. These suspects were ultimately arrested, tried, and convicted in U.S. federal court on terrorism charges. I was very proud that the headline read a terrorist plot to kill Americans had been thwarted, rather than reporting a loss of life.

What is the best career or life advice you have to give?

Be self-aware and use your strengths to cultivate a positive reputation with everyone you come into contact with.

Tracie L. Keegan: New Haven Field Office

Source: US FBI

Prior to joining the FBI, I was in the U.S. Army, and was a police sergeant in Fayetteville, North Carolina. My first assignment with the FBI was in the Chicago Field Office. While in Chicago, I investigated violent crimes, crimes against children, and civil rights violations. In 2006, I transferred to the Phoenix Field Office and was assigned to the Lake Havasu City Resident Agency, where I investigated violent crimes on the three Indian reservations. In 2018, I transferred to the New Haven Field Office where I was assigned to the counterterrorism program.

In 2019, I was promoted to supervisory special agent at FBI Headquarters and managed the Indian Country Program for the southern United States, including Phoenix, Albuquerque, and Oklahoma City. In 2021, I returned to the New Haven Field Office to supervise a squad that oversees nine different programs

Describe your most memorable case or investigative success.

All of my most memorable cases occurred while I was assigned to the Phoenix Field Office.

In 2012, I investigated the murder of a 2-year-old Native American girl, along with the aggravated assault of two of her siblings on the Fort Mojave Indian reservation. The suspect was initially taken into state custody. After determining the suspect was Native American, he was transferred to federal custody. The suspect was convicted and sentenced to 35 years in prison. Even though we got justice for the victims, the trauma and devastation to this family was incalculable.

Vanessa K. Stelly: Jacksonville Field Office

Source: US FBI

Whether it be an email, financial transaction, or key witness, when you finally find that key piece of evidence, it is truly an “a-ha” moment. Late one night I was sitting at my desk, pouring through documents, and I discovered a pattern of ATM withdrawals and cash deposits that revealed a long-term member of Congress had been stealing from a charity she publicly endorsed. She was later convicted, and the success of this investigation is one of my proudest career moments.

Share the thing you’re most proud of from your FBI career.

I am thrilled that my career has now sparked desire in my two daughters to become FBI special agents, a path that never crossed my mind when I was their age. They have witnessed my hard work and dedication and have seen my love for the job. They have even come to watch me at trial.

My mom jokes that I use my “FBI voice” from time-to-time—confident and inquisitive, but courteous. As young women, I also want my girls to have an “FBI voice” and be strong and speak with purpose.

Suzanne Allen: Phoenix Field Office

Source: US FBI

What does it mean to make room at the table? Why does it matter?

I am a firm believer in making room at the table for other women. It is both empowering and inspirational that women are occupying more roles in the FBI than ever before. Still, I have been at many tables, both in law enforcement and private sector settings, where I am the only female. At one such table, I remember confronting a subject on a particular inconsistency in his story. In that moment, I understood the weight of the responsibility that I was carrying. Not only was I representing the Bureau, but I was honoring the women who came before me and setting the stage for women who would follow. I am mindful of this and encourage other women to accompany me on engagements, whether it is another agent, intelligence analyst, forensic accountant, or professional staff.

It is important for everyone to see women succeed in and be authorities in these roles. I have also learned to advocate for the things I believe in, without worrying about ruffling feathers, and believe me, I’ve ruffled feathers! Everyone brings unique and varied experiences to any position. That diversity of thought only serves to strengthen the whole community, which ultimately leads to amazing results.

What is the best career or life advice you’ve been given?

Family first. I care deeply about my cases, and complex case investigations require long hours and intense work. I want my cases to be prosecuted; I want to see justice served and a remedy for victims. But there is also a trade-off because when I’m knee-deep in interviews and financial records, I’m spending less time with my family. I miss games, competitions, school events, and I’m conducting surveillance on Mother’s Day.

I have learned to thoughtfully evaluate situations as they arise and consider the time investment required before accepting, negotiating, or declining opportunities. Shifting into the private sector coordinator position affords me the flexibility to be more intentional with my time. This helps me feel better about my “mom guilt” because when I’m at the end of my life, I know I’m not going to say, “Boy, I wish I had spent less time with my family.”

Describe your most memorable case or investigative success.

My most memorable case was the investigation into Daylon Pierce. He was a convicted felon who represented himself as a stockbroker on dating websites to meet women and scam them. He defrauded multiple women out of nearly $2 million and spent it all. He bullied these women into silence, and they felt that they had no recourse.

But when two of them came forward to the FBI, we were able to arrest him. The arrest and subsequent indictment received a lot of media attention, which prompted other women to come forward. The brazen nature of the fraud, and the number of women who had been victimized, was very unsettling to me.

I felt like this investigation made a difference to those women who were victimized. Their voices were heard in court, and they helped secure a lengthy prison sentence. The case was subsequently covered on a television show, and my hope is that women who may have been victimized in a similar fashion will see it and find the courage to come forward.

Thuy Zoback: San Francisco Field Office

Source: US FBI

Kenny—who looked like a motorcycle gang member but was actually a jolly and kind-hearted father of seven—took me under his wing right away and showed me the ropes. I was received with much skepticism by many of the other officers on the task force, as I was a young Asian female who didn’t look like the traditional “FBI agent.”

Kenny saw right through the surface and saw my hunger and drive. Kenny told me not to worry about a thing, that if I worked hard and used my skills they’d accept me before I knew it. He asked me to be his co-case investigator on a probe into a cartel-linked drug distribution organization. We became so busy working long hours on surveillance and listening to weeks’ worth of chatter on wiretaps that I didn’t have time to care about “fitting in.”

But soon, I noticed a change in people’s perceptions of me. Before long, I became part of the group, and no one thought twice about throwing me into any sticky situation that came our way. Kenny and I ended that initial investigation with huge drug seizures and arrests. But we didn’t stop there. We rolled right into another one, then another one. Kenny taught me how to become a great earnest investigator while still making family, friends, and co-workers the highest priority. After working three consecutive cases with Kenny as my partner, we ended up with the seizure of more than 1,000 pounds of methamphetamine, countless arrests and indictments, and almost $2 million in cash.

In 2016, after our task force disbanded and we moved on to other stages in our careers, Kenny was tragically killed in an accident while on his way to work. But after almost 13 years as an agent, I can still claim he singlehandedly made me the strong, resilient, adventure-seeking, out-of-the-box thinking, and hard-working agent that I am today. 

What does it mean to make room at the table? Why does it matter?

To make room at the table is to readily embrace the differences in our peers, because one might be surprised at what they have to offer. I’ve been underestimated in countless situations by fellow law enforcement officers and by subjects that we investigate. I get, “Wow, you don’t look like an FBI agent,” or “I want to see your ID again, I don’t believe you” a lot!

Regardless, I love seeing the look on their faces when they realize we come in all shapes and sizes, and we can often bring a lot more to the table than someone who just “fits the mold.” It makes me feel even better knowing that I may have changed their perception and that it’s never wise to judge a book by its cover. We, as special agents, may not all look like what people envision us to be (picture Fox Mulder or Johnny Utah), but I think that makes us even more special. (In my opinion, it’s always better to be perceived as the underdog anyway!)  

California Man Indicted for Unlawfully Exporting Aircraft Components to Iran

Source: US FBI

The Justice Department unsealed an indictment charging U.S.-Iranian national Jeffrey Chance Nader, 68, with crimes related to the illicit export of U.S.-manufactured aircraft components, including components used on military aircraft, to Iran in violation of U.S. economic sanctions and other federal laws. Nader was arrested yesterday in California. 

“This action demonstrates the Justice Department’s commitment to keeping military-grade equipment out of the hands of the Iranian regime,” said Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen of the Justice Department’s National Security Division. “We will aggressively investigate, disrupt, and hold accountable criminal networks that supply sensitive technology to hostile and repressive governments in contravention of U.S. sanctions.” 

“Attacks by Iran and its proxies on U.S. allies in the Middle East and its ongoing supply of Russia with drones and other technology to be used in its illegal war against Ukraine demonstrate why we must do all that we can to stop Iran from acquiring U.S. parts, services, and technology,” said U.S. Attorney Matthew M. Graves for the District of Columbia. “The charges announced today represent the latest step in our ongoing effort to hold accountable those who illegally funnel goods and services to Iran and to deter others from doing the same.” 

“Iran has no business using U.S.-manufactured parts and components to keep their planes and drones in the sky,” said Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement Matthew S. Axelrod of the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security. “Stopping these items before they get to our adversaries – like we did here – reflects the real-world impact we’re having through the Disruptive Technology Strike Force.” 

“This indictment highlights the FBI’s commitment to enforcing export laws by holding those accountable who allegedly try to smuggle U.S.-origin military equipment to the benefit of Iran,” said Executive Assistant Director Robert Wells of the FBI’s National Security Branch. “Any circumvention of U.S. export control law is unacceptable, and the FBI works diligently with its partners across the globe to seek out and bring to justice those who violate export laws along with any shell companies that support such activities.”

According to the indictment, beginning at least in 2023, Nader and other associates, conspired to purchase and illegally export – and attempted to export – from the United States to Iran four types of aircraft components, totaling nearly three dozen individual pieces. Some of these components are for use on military aircraft operated by Iran’s armed forces, including the F-4 fighter jet. 

Nader, acting on purchase orders he received from customers in Iran, coordinated the purchase of relevant aircraft components with business associates in Iran, by which Nader and his Iran-based associates would reach out to U.S.-based suppliers of such components. In several instances, Nader falsely identified himself and his company, California-based Pro Aero Capital, to the U.S.-based suppliers as the end user of the items.  

Once Nader obtained the aircraft components, he attempted to export the items on multiple occasions to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The items were then to be transshipped to the ultimate customer in Iran. The items discussed in the indictment, however, were detained by a Special Agent with the Department of Commerce, and none were successfully exported from the United States. 

The FBI Washington Field Office and the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security is investigating the case, with assistance provided by the FBI Los Angeles Field Office.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Steven B. Wasserman for the District of Columbia and Trial Attorney Sean Heiden of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section are prosecuting the case. Significant assistance was provided by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California.  

This prosecution is being coordinated through the Disruptive Technology Strike Force, an interagency law enforcement strike force co-led by the Departments of Justice and Commerce designed to target illicit actors, protect supply chains, and prevent critical technology from being acquired by authoritarian regimes and hostile nation states. Under the leadership of the Assistant Attorney General for National Security and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement, the Strike Force leverages tools and authorities across the U.S. Government to enhance the criminal and administrative enforcement of export control laws.  

An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law. 

U.S. Army Intelligence Analyst Pleads Guilty to Charges of Conspiracy to Obtain and Disclose National Defense Information, Export Control Violations, and Bribery

Source: US FBI

Korbein Schultz, a U.S. Army soldier and intelligence analyst, pleaded guilty today to all charges against him in the indictment returned by a federal grand jury in March 2024 charging him with conspiracy to obtain and disclose national defense information, exporting technical data related to defense articles without a license, conspiracy to export defense articles without a license, and bribery of a public official.  

“The defendant abused his access to restricted government systems to sell sensitive military information to a person he knew to be a foreign national,” said Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen of the Justice Department’s National Security Division. “By conspiring to transmit national defense information to a person living outside the United States, this defendant callously put our national security at risk to cash in on the trust our military placed in him. Today’s guilty plea is a stark reminder that those who would betray their sworn oath for personal gain will be identified and brought to justice.”  

“This defendant sold national defense information to a foreign actor and conspired to corrupt other members of our military,” said U.S. Attorney Henry C. Leventis for the Middle District of Tennessee. “In doing so, he violated his training and his oath as a member of the armed services and he compromised our national security. Today’s guilty plea to all of the charges in the indictment ensures that he will be held fully accountable for his crimes.” 

“The defendant has admitted guilt in a case that should send a strong message to any U.S. service members thinking about betraying their country,” said Executive Assistant Director Robert Wells of the FBI’s National Security Branch. “The U.S. is governed by the rule of law and when persons placed in a position of trust violate that trust, the FBI and our partners will hold them accountable.  Governments like China are aggressively targeting our military personnel and national security information and we will do everything in our power to ensure that information is safeguarded from hostile foreign governments.” 

“This Soldier swore an oath to faithfully discharge his duties, to include protecting national defense information. Not only did he fail in his sworn duty, but he placed personal gain above his duty to our country and disclosed information that could give advantage to a foreign nation, putting his fellow Soldiers in jeopardy,” said Brigadier General Rhett R. Cox, Commanding General of the Army Counterintelligence Command. “Army Counterintelligence Command, with our partners at the FBI, Department of Justice, and the greater intelligence community will ruthlessly pursue those who commit acts such as these. Let this case serve as a warning: if any member of the Army, past or present, is asked for classified or sensitive information, they should report it to the appropriate authorities within 24 hours or be held fully accountable for their inaction.”

According to charging and plea documents, Schultz – an enlisted intelligence analyst in the U.S. Army who held a Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) security clearance – conspired with an individual who lived in Hong Kong and whom Schultz suspected of being associated with the Chinese Government (Conspirator A) to collect national defense information, including classified information and export-controlled technical data related to U.S. military weapons systems, and to transmit that information to Conspirator A in exchange for money. Schultz entered into this conspiracy even though, as part of his official duties in the Army, he was required (1) to protect national defense information, classified information, and controlled unclassified information (CUI); (2) to train other members of his unit on the proper handling, storage and dissemination of classified information and information marked CUI; and (3) to report suspicious incidents, including attempts by anyone without authorization to receive classified or sensitive information about U.S. military operations, organizations, equipment, or personnel.

During the conspiracy, Conspirator A told Schultz the specific information that Conspirator A wanted Schultz to gather and send to him, including sensitive information related to missile defense and mobile artillery systems. Before he was arrested, Schultz sent Conspirator A dozens of sensitive and restricted (but unclassified) U.S. military documents regarding a variety of U.S. military weapons systems and U.S. military tactics and strategy, including documents containing export-controlled technical data. Among the items that Schultz collected and transmitted to Conspirator A were: (1) a document discussing the lessons learned by the U.S. Army from the Ukraine/Russia war that it would apply in a defense of Taiwan; (2) an operations order outlining the deployment of  the defendant’s unit to Eastern Europe in support of NATO operations; (3) an Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (AFTTP) document relating to the HH-60 helicopter, which included a banner warning that the document contained technical data subject to export controls; (4) an AFTTP manual relating to the F-22A fighter aircraft, which included a banner warning that the document contained technical data subject to export controls; (5) an AFTTP manual relating to the operation of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile systems, which included a banner warning that the document contained technical data subject to export controls; (6) a publication related to the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft; (7) a document describing modifications of the B-52 aircraft; (8) documents describing tactics to counter unmanned aircraft systems and the use of unmanned aircraft systems in large-scale combat operations; (9) documents relating to Chinese military tactics, the Chinese military’s preparedness, and the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force; (10) documents relating to rocket, missile, and artillery weapons systems, including the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense system; (11) documents relating to military exercises and U.S. military forces in the Republic of Korea and the Philippines; and (12) a document relating to U.S. military satellites. In exchange for all of this information, Schultz was paid approximately $42,000 by Conspirator A.

A sentencing hearing is scheduled for Jan. 23, 2025. Schultz faces a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison for conspiracy to obtain and transmit national defense information; 20 years in prison for exporting technical data related to defense articles to the People’s Republic of China without a license; 20 years in prison for conspiracy to violate the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR); and 15 years in prison for bribery of a public official. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

The FBI and U.S. Army Counterintelligence Command are investigating the case.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Josh Kurtzman for the Middle District of Tennessee and Trial Attorneys Adam Barry and Christopher Cook of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section are prosecuting the case.

FBI Releases Motor Vehicle Theft, 2019—2023

Source: US FBI

On August 12, 2024, the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program released Motor Vehicle Theft, 2019-2023, on the FBI’s Crime Data Explorer at cde.ucr.cjis.gov. This special report provides information concerning motor vehicle theft and trends on carjacking.

Incidents of motor vehicle theft included in this report are from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS). Participation in NIBRS is voluntary for non-federal law enforcement agencies but mandatory for federal law enforcement agencies. As of 2023, 14,039 agencies submitted their crime data to NIBRS, covering a population of 278,449,430 people.

From 2019 to 2023, as more agencies began participating in NIBRS, the population covered by NIBRS reporting agencies increased by 79.7 percent. In this analysis, the total number of incidents are reported alongside rates per 100,000 people to allow for comparison between years.

Both the total number of reported incidents per year and the rate of incidents per 100,000 people steadily increased from 2019 to 2023.

From 2019 to 2023, the nationwide rate of motor vehicle theft incidents rose from 199.4 incidents per 100,000 people to 283.5 incidents. From 2022 to 2023, incident rates declined in the Midwest by 4.8 and the West by 7.3. The rate of offenses committed by juveniles increased in 2022 and 2023, while the rate of offenses committed by adults decreased during that time. In addition, between 2022 and 2023, the rate of reported carjacking incidents declined from 7.5 to 6.6 per 100,000 people.

The top three types of motor vehicles stolen from 2019 to 2023 were automobiles at 78.1 percent, trucks at 12.2 percent, and other motor vehicles at 8.0 percent.

Reporting data on motor vehicle thefts and carjackings allows the public to gain insight and may aid law enforcement agencies in creating strategies to reduce and prevent similar offenses in the future.

Douglas M. Goodwater Named Special Agent in Charge of the Oklahoma City Field Office

Source: US FBI

Director Christopher Wray has named Douglas M. Goodwater as the special agent in charge of the Oklahoma City Field Office. Mr. Goodwater most recently served as a section chief in the Office of Public Affairs at FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. 
 
Mr. Goodwater joined the FBI as a special agent in 2007. During his first assignment in the Oklahoma City Field Office, he investigated gangs and drug trafficking organizations as part of the Safe Streets Task Force and worked on violent crime investigations. 
 
In 2013, Mr. Goodwater transferred to the Guam Resident Agency, a satellite of the Honolulu Field Office. In Guam, Mr. Goodwater investigated financial crimes and public corruption and participated in the Drug Enforcement Administration Task Force. In 2015, Mr. Goodwater was promoted to supervisory special agent in the Counterterrorism Division at FBI Headquarters, where he worked in a regional operations unit supporting international terrorism investigations. 
 
Mr. Goodwater transferred to the Houston Field Office in 2016 as supervisory special agent overseeing international terrorism investigations. He later supervised Houston’s Transnational Organized Crime – Western Hemisphere squad, which was co-located with the multi-agency Houston Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Strike Force. 
 
In 2020, Mr. Goodwater was selected to serve as an assistant special agent in charge in the Chicago Field Office, overseeing the Criminal Enterprise Branch. Later in 2020, he assumed the position of Chicago’s deputy special agent in charge and was responsible for the Executive Services Branch, which included SWAT, security, internal audit, community outreach, media, and training. 
 
Mr. Goodwater was promoted in 2022 to chief of the Media and Engagement Section of the Office of Public Affairs at FBI Headquarters, where he had oversight of the National Press Office and the Community Relations Unit, with responsibility for the FBI’s media and community relations programs. 
 
Mr. Goodwater earned a bachelor’s degree in business from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and a Master of Business Administration from the University of Nebraska Omaha.