Category: MIL-OSI

Source: US FBI

Estas estafas les han costado a las víctimas más de $300 millones de dólares. Aprenda cómo protegerse.

El FBI ha visto un aumento en las estafas dirigidas a propietarios de tiempo compartido. En este tipo de estafa, los delincuentes engañan a estos propietarios de tiempo parcial para que desembolsen cuantiosas sumas de dinero en efectivo, todo bajo falsas pretensiones relacionadas con sus propiedades de tiempo compartido.

Su elección principal de víctima—estadounidenses mayores—técnicamente esto hace que el fraude de tiempo compartido sea una forma de fraude a personas mayores, o delito que tiene como objetivo hacer que los estadounidenses mayores sean despojados de su dinero o criptomoneda. El FBI investiga agresivamente tales delitos para salvaguardar de estafas a una población particularmente vulnerable, dijo el Agente Especial Adjunto a Cargo Paul Roberts, quien dirige la Subdivisión de Delitos Financieros Complejos en la Oficina de Nueva York.

“Los estafadores de tiempo compartido tienen como objetivo dejar a las víctimas sin nada, lo cual deja en las victimas consecuencias devastadoras en su futuro financiero, relaciones, salud física y emocional”, señaló el mismo.

Sin embargo, indicó él, el fraude de tiempo compartido también se encuentra en el radar del Buró debido a que sus ganancias ilícitas se utilizan cada vez más para financiar cárteles violentos en México. “A medida que los cárteles cimientan aún más su control en este espacio, es especialmente crítico que el FBI tome la iniciativa en abordar esta amenaza a personas mayores estadounidenses”, dijo Roberts. Él agregó que algunos estafadores participan en estos esquemas porque temen convertirse en las próximas víctimas de estos cárteles.

Los cárteles han operado los fraudes de tiempo compartido más reportados que involucran propiedades en México, dijo Roberts. El Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), el Cártel del Golfo y el Cártel de Sinaloa han estado ejecutando esquemas de fraude de tiempo compartido, para ayudar a financiar sus actividades ilícitas, durante más de diez años. Hasta la fecha, basado en denuncias y rastreo financieros, el FBI cree que el CJNG ha sido el cártel que predominantemente participa en fraudes de tiempo compartido en México. Sin embargo, es probable que los centros de llamadas independientes en México también estén participando en este delito.

El fraude de tiempo compartido es una operación atractiva para los cárteles ya que es más barato y representa menos desafíos logísticos, laborales y de supervisión que otras operaciones generadoras de ingresos como el tráfico de drogas y armas, explicó Roberts.

“El fraude de tiempo compartido tiene costos generalmente bajos y reinversión mínima ya que sólo se necesita un alquiler de espacio reducido, configuración de telecomunicaciones y empleados de habla inglesa con acceso a bases de datos de complejos turísticos”, dijo Roberts. “Se percibe un menor riesgo de enjuiciamiento y de extradición por fraude de tiempo compartido, y en cambio sí es un flujo de efectivo fácil que va directamente al sistema bancario mexicano, ofuscando los fondos para facilitar las actividades de lavado de dinero”.

Estos esquemas—impactan desproporcionadamente a los estadounidenses ricos y mayores que quieren recuperar parte del dinero que gastaron en sus tiempos compartidos—dejan huellas emocionales y financieras en sus víctimas”.

Sin embargo, el FBI está utilizando una combinación de asociaciones estratégicas para detectar, investigar y prevenir estos esquemas.

“Nos asociamos con una variedad de diferentes agencias para investigar estos casos, las cuales incluyen la Administración Federal Antidrogas de Estados Unidos (DEA, por sus siglas en inglés) y a la Oficina de Control de Activos Extranjeros del Departamento del Tesoro de Estados Unidos (OFAC, por sus siglas en inglés)”, dijo Roberts. “Asimismo coordinamos con agencias estatales y locales para asegurarnos también de recibir denuncias de víctimas presentadas ante estas instancias. Trabajamos cada vez más con socios del sector privado en la industria financiera para ayudar en la detección y prevención de estos fraudes”.

¿Cómo Funcionan Las Estafas de Fraude de Tiempo Compartido?

Para llevar a cabo sus estafas, los estafadores realizan una amplia investigación sobre sus posibles víctimas. Los delincuentes crean documentos falsos y se hacen pasar por personas de instituciones confiables para embaucar a las víctimas con sus historias y asustarlas para lograr que cumplan.

“A lo largo del proceso, los estafadores utilizan una combinación de tácticas de ventas de alta presión y estrategias de fraude cibernéticas, tales como las de imitar direcciones de correo electrónico de entidades legítimas y falsificar documentos oficiales, para convencer a las víctimas de que cada fase de la estafa es legítima”, explicó Roberts.

Y, añadió Roberts, este no es un tipo de estafa de una sola vez. Los estafadores suelen utilizar una combinación de esquemas para re-victimizar a los propietarios de tiempo compartido durante un período de varios años.

Estos tipos de estafas suelen desarrollarse en tres fases, explicó Roberts.

En la fase uno, dijo, los estafadores hacen contacto con la víctima por primera vez por teléfono o por correo electrónico.

“En estas comunicaciones iniciales con las víctimas, los estafadores a menudo se hacen pasar por  corredores terciarios de tiempo compartido o representantes de venta de la industria de tiempo compartido, bienes raíces o servicios financieros localizados en Estados Unidos o México”, dijo Roberts.

Los estafadores luego instan a la víctima a tomar una de estas tres acciones:

1. Salirse de su tiempo compartido
2. Alquilar su propiedad de tiempo compartido
3. Invertir en certificados de acciones para su tiempo compartido

Los estafadores posteriormente presionan a las víctimas a que paguen por adelantado honorarios o impuestos para asegurar estos acuerdos, explicó Roberts.

Y, advirtió Roberts, los estafadores hacen su tarea. Antes de empezar a estafar a las víctimas, estos se ponen en contacto con fuentes dentro de la industria del tiempo compartido para obtener información sobre las propiedades de tiempo compartido y sus dueños. También hacen hasta lo imposible para vender a sus objetivos [victimas] la autenticidad de sus esquemas por medio de contractos redactados, cartas de oferta y documentación de cuentas bancarias fraudulentos.

“Los estafadores, asimismo, con el fin de reforzar su credibilidad, se apalancan de una vigorosa red de sitios web de empresas falsas, nombres de negocios y direcciones, registros con funcionarios gubernamentales y grupos comerciales”, dijo Roberts.

Y, agregó, los estafadores son aparentemente angloparlantes fluidos quienes han memorizado respuestas a preguntas frecuentes sobre sus negocios falsos para así vender aún más la farsa de que sus argumentos de venta son legítimos.

Los estafadores después exigen repetidos pagos adelantados hasta que la víctima se queda sin dinero o se entera de su esquema.

En la fase dos de la estafa, los estafadores vuelven a acercarse a las víctimas después de haber pasado algún tiempo. En esta ocasión, los estafadores se hacen pasar por empleados de bufetes de abogados que quieren ayudar a las víctimas a recuperar el dinero que éstas les entregaron a los estafadores en la fase uno.

“Los estafadores a menudo afirman que los estafadores iniciales han sido acusados de fraude o considerados jurídicamente responsables en una demanda en Estados Unidos o México, y que a las víctimas se les debe restituir en el acuerdo de reposición”, explicó Roberts. No obstante, para acceder a ese dinero de restitución, a las víctimas se les dice que deben pagar honorarios legales o judiciales a los bufetes de abogados. Los estafadores subsecuentemente defraudan a las víctimas con una serie de pagos anticipados relacionados con este acuerdo; nuevamente utilizando documentos falsos para reforzar su credibilidad”.

La tercera fase de la estafa implica la suplantación del gobierno. Los estafadores se hacen pasar por funcionarios de la OFAC, de la Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera del gobierno de México o de otras entidades internacionales, tales como la INTERPOL.

Luego toman una de dos vías:

• Los suplantadores del gobierno afirman que están contactando a las víctimas porque tienen acceso a acuerdos penales y desean ayudarlas a recuperar el dinero perdido.
• O bien, los suplantadores tratan de asustar a las víctimas para que proporcionen aún más dinero. Esto lo hacen informándoles a las víctimas de que sus pagos iniciales a los estafadores de tiempo compartido se consideraron sospechosos. Los estafadores luego les dicen a las víctimas que las autoridades determinaron que sus pagos a los estafadores de tiempo compartido estaban “vinculados al lavado de dinero o a operaciones terroristas”. Subsecuentemente, estos amenazan con citar a las víctimas a comparecer o con enviarlas a prisión si no pagan dinero adicional con el fin de asegurar de que sus pagos se liberen y se limpien sus nombres.

Reconocer las Señales

El fraude de tiempo compartido no se denuncia por dos razones principales: Las víctimas o no se dan cuenta de que están siendo estafadas, o no se dan cuenta de que hay ayuda disponible. Dicho esto, el FBI y la Comisión Federal de Comercio han visto recientemente un repunte en denuncias. En los últimos cinco años, dijo Roberts, más de 6,000 víctimas han reportado a las agencias más de 300 millones de dólares en pérdidas.

El FBI espera que una mayor cobertura mediática del fraude de tiempo compartido eduque al público sobre la amenaza e inspire a más víctimas a presentar denuncias.

“No hay nada vergonzoso en caer víctima de una estafa como esta”, dijo Roberts. “Lo peor que la gente puede hacer es sufrir en silencio por vergüenza o por miedo a la crítica”.

Mientras tanto, usted puede protegerse de caer víctima de fraude de tiempo compartido sí reconoce las señales.

• Primero, dijo éste, nadie le debería pedir que pague honorarios o impuestos por adelantado, ni le debería pedir que proporcione un formulario de poder notarial. Ninguna de éstas es práctica estándar de la industria. Cada uno es una señal de peligro.
• Próximo, dijo él, si alguien que dice ser funcionario del gobierno se pone en contacto con usted, esa persona no debería:
• Ponerse en contacto con usted sobre un acuerdo de restitución.
• Amenazarlo con arresto o enjuiciamiento si no se paga el dinero.
• Amenazarlo con citatorio a comparecer ante un tribunal fuera de los Estados Unidos.
• Afirmar el estar trabajando con el FBI y/o la Oficina de Control de Activos Extranjeros del Departamento del Tesoro de Estados Unidos para expedirle un citatorio.
• Por último, usted puede tomar algunas medidas proactivas para protegerse contra la estafa de fraude de tiempo compartido. No conteste llamadas telefónicas de números desconocidos.
• Si alguien se comunica con usted sobre su tiempo compartido y solicita dinero por adelantado, deje de comunicarse con ellos y no pague.
• Nunca firme, certifique ante notario, ni envíe ningún poder notarial o documentos legales por correo electrónico.

Las Posibles Consecuencias del Fraude de Tiempo Compartido

Las personas que ayudan a orquestar estafas de fraude de tiempo compartido pueden enfrentar la extradición a Estados Unidos y posible enjuiciamiento por una serie de cargos penales, los que incluye:

• Fraude electrónico
• Fraude bancario
• Confabulación para cometer fraude electrónico
• Confabulación para cometer fraude bancario
• Blanqueo de dinero
• Cargos por la Ley sobre organizaciones corruptas influidas por el crimen organizado (RICO)

Source: US FBI

Source: US FBI

Our Victim Services Division provides support to child victims and witnesses of federal crimes, as well as their families and loved ones, through investigative forensic interviews and coordination with victim specialists who ensure all parties receive the proper care when faced with devastating challenges. The team is trained to ensure that any interactions with child victims or witnesses are tailored to the child’s stage of development and to minimize any additional trauma to the child.

A missing child is someone whose whereabouts became unknown when they were aged 17 or younger. Victim Services Division personnel often support these cases even as time progresses and the victim who went missing as a child may have grown into an adult. Regardless of how the child initially went missing, victim specialists work with families and loved ones, as well as victims who have been found. 

“That family is missing their child during crisis. We would respond the same to that family,” explained Jennifer Piero, a victim specialist at the FBI Cleveland Field Office. “If the FBI were involved in the case or asked by a police department to become involved, we would immediately start providing the family with updates and any services we can provide, as well as crisis intervention.”

Victim specialists work with the families throughout the investigation—no matter how long—and are often present during a victim’s recovery.

When victim specialists are assigned a case, they immediately start working with FBI agents, task force officers, and local law enforcement to meet the missing child’s family. These first interactions are the foundations for building trust with the families. The victim specialist looks into the following: 

• Who are the missing child’s relatives? 
• Are there siblings, and, if so, are they juveniles? 
• Which family members should be interviewed for background information?

“Siblings may know different things than parents, so we have to look at setting up child interviews with our child and adolescent forensic interviewers, or CAFIs. The CAFIs gather information they might know, such as whether they might have witnessed anything the missing child had done or somebody they had talked to before disappearing,” said Piero. 

“Then there are the assessments of the parents that the agents are working on to ensure that a parent is not potentially involved in the child’s disappearance,” continued Piero. “Once they’ve ruled out that possibility, we continue to work with the family. We coordinate communication with the agents to ensure the family is the first to receive updates about the case.”

Victim specialists also assess whether initial crisis intervention and counseling services are needed and ensure those resources are provided. As the investigation develops, victim specialists will work with FBI public affairs and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) to alert the public about the missing child and ask for help finding them. 

One of NCMEC’s vital roles includes creating age-progressed photos of the victim. These photos are shared on NCMEC’s website and FBI missing person posters and disseminated to law enforcement and media outlets.

“We obtain photos of the victim’s family members—mom, the dad, any family members—to provide an image of what that child might look like at an older age,” said Piero. “Once NCMEC creates that image, we take it to the family and have them give us some critiques or say what they think might be different, because they know their child best.”

And as victim specialists help agents and task force offers gather and share information related to the case, they are simultaneously developing plans for if and when a victim is found and reunited with their family to ensure the transition goes as smoothly as possible. Some items to consider include: 

• What are the logistics for reuniting the victim with their family? 
• What are the logistics to ensure the victim receives medical assistance?  
• What is the plan to help mitigate interactions with the community and the press? 

For instance, events like large celebratory gatherings and homecomings immediately after a successful recovery—though often well-intentioned—may be too overwhelming for the victim and their families at that time. Victim specialists will help manage these scenarios. In one case, victim specialists helped arrange the first reunification between the victim and their family at a location outside their town so they could have some privacy before facing the general public and media.

“We want to mitigate any types of secondary trauma, making sure that people aren’t asking the victim questions that are not victim sensitive,” said Catherine Connell, unit chief of the Child Victim Services Unit. 

Source: US FBI

Investigating Laser Strikes 

The first federal laser law was enacted in 2012, when Congress passed it as part of the reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration.  

Before 2012, the Bureau pursued laser pointer investigations under a law forbidding “destruction of an aircraft,” which Gates likened to “trying to smash a square peg into the round hole.” 

The 2012 federal statute makes it illegal for people to “knowingly” point a laser pointer’s beam “at an aircraft”—whether private, commercial, or military—or its flight path. Most importantly, it attaches consequences to this action: A monetary fine of up to $250,000 and/or a federal prison sentence of up to five years. On top of that, the FAA’s website notes that it “can impose civil penalties of up to $11,000” each time someone aims a laser beam at an aircraft. 

“That suddenly gave us real teeth in enforcement,” Gates said of the statute. “It made shining a laser pointer at an aircraft a five-year maximum penalty felony, which is a really big deal.” 

And, as Gates recalls, it paid off: He opened his first investigation into a laser strike violation within two months of the law’s implementation, which eventually resulted in a conviction. 

According to the FAA, the profile of individuals responsible for laser strikes differs between different locations of the country. But when it comes to FBI investigations into such incidents, Gates said, “we’re looking for that person who’s intentionally tracking an aircraft, who does it over and over.” 

He said that red flags for FBI investigators include: 

• A laser beam that follows an aircraft as it moves 
• A laser beam that keeps coming at an aircraft, even after its position has changed 
• Clusters of laser strikes reports from aircraft traversing the same stretch of airspace 

The FBI commonly catches laser strike offenders in collaboration with federal and local law enforcement partners, Gates explained. 

The universally accepted procedure is that an air traffic controller notifies local law enforcement dispatch, who will then notify law enforcement air units and ground patrols, if available, the FAA said. 

From there, if a local police helicopter deploys to the scene and gets lased, they can use technology like infrared cameras to pinpoint the exact location the laser beam came from.

Helicopter crews can then reach out to their agencies for on-the-ground backup or call the FBI for assistance. An October 2022 laser strike against an Austin Police Department helicopter led to the arrest and conviction of two Texas men, Ventresca noted.  

Bureau partnerships with local, state, and federal partners—as well as with commercial airlines—are key to ensuring that members of the aviation and law enforcement communities know how to seek the Bureau’s help in addressing laser strikes. This is especially important in states and municipalities that lack laser-strike laws of their own, since local or state authorities can ask the FBI to investigate incidents in those areas as federal crimes. 

Help Us Protect the Skies 

We’ve all likely mistaken an airplane for a star or other celestial body at least once in our lives. But pointing out a possible star with a laser could endanger the aircrew if your suspicion is wrong. For this reason, it’s best to keep your laser pointers out of the sky. 

If you spot someone aiming a laser at the sky in a suspicious manner, you can report it to the FBI by calling 1-800-CALL-FBI (1-800-225-5324) or visiting tips.fbi.gov. You can also report laser strikes to the FAA. 

You should contact the FBI immediately if you see someone playing with lasers near—or otherwise posing a threat to—an airport. 

Finally, if you’re thinking of gifting a laser pointer to someone—especially if they’re a minor—educate them on the very real dangers of misusing these devices. 

“If we can prevent one 15-year-old from ending up with federal or state charges or even the large fine, that’s a win,” Ventresca said. “If we can prevent one catastrophe, prevent one pilot from being blinded, that makes it worth it.” 

Resources: 

Source: US FBI

Source: US FBI

For instance, during a case that involved reaching out to an Amish community that did not use technology, VOSS worked with a local newspaper in Pennsylvania to translate seeking victim information into Pennsylvania Dutch, so it was accessible to the community.

“Our biggest asset that we have is our liaison partners,” said Shannon.

Once someone fills out a Seeking Victim information questionnaire, the VOSS team will compile the data and turn it over to the investigative case team and victim specialists.

“We have victims carrying heavy trauma who need direct services immediately, so our victim specialists will step in as soon as possible,” said Shannon. “Even if victims may not need a service right away, the victim specialists are very good about making sure they know they have access to getting more help when they’re ready.”

It’s never too late to fill out a Seeking Victim Information questionnaire—even if the crime happened years ago, there is no statute of limitations for reporting your experience. You can choose if you want to receive further notifications regarding a case or you can decide to report your experience and then cease communications. Any information you provide could be valuable information used to protect and help others who were also victimized and further prevent additional people from getting hurt. 

Source: US FBI

It started when a reporter asked the FBI about writing a story to highlight the “toughest guys” being sought by the Bureau at the time. The FBI provided the names and descriptions of ten fugitives to the reporter. The resulting feature became a major story that garnered national attention. Recognizing the potential of public involvement, then-FBI Director J. Edward Hoover formalized the list and named it what we know it as today. Since then, the FBI has continued to use the list to enlist public support in locating dangerous criminals. Through evolving media channels and digital platforms, the list remains a symbol of partnership between law enforcement and the public.

As the nature of crime and FBI priorities have evolved over the years, the makeup of the Top Ten list has also changed. While the list began by featuring bank robbers and murder suspects fleeing state jurisdiction, it has evolved into a tool to search for major organized crime figures, cybercriminals, child predators, and white-collar criminals. The list also reflects the international scope of crime, which emphasizes the importance of strong global partnerships in the search for violent criminals who know no boundaries and pose a significant danger to all.

Just as the list’s focus has broadened, so too have the methods by which the FBI communicates with the public. In the early years, newspapers and magazines initially brought broader participation to the program. Today, the FBI uses the internet, television, social media, and digital billboards while continuing to rely on the public’s assistance in locating wanted fugitives. Foreign media and broadcasting services are now also assisting with the pursuit of international criminals as the FBI continues to recognize the unique ability of the media to cast a wider net within communities both here and abroad.

That reporter’s idea, so many years ago, to form a partnership among law enforcement, the media, and the citizens of the world continues to prove beneficial today. As the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted Fugitives program celebrates 75 years of success, the expectation is that it will continue to empower citizens across the country and around the world to safely and effectively assist law enforcement for years to come. 

The FBI places a high priority on the fugitive investigations that are added to the list. In many cases, the Bureau offers rewards of up to $250,000 for information that leads directly to the arrest of a fugitive.

More information about the Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list is available at fbi.gov/topten.

All available graphics and video are available at dvidshub.net/units/FBI.

Source: US FBI

The U.S. Department of Justice today announced that eight defendants have pleaded guilty for their conduct in a long-running and violent conspiracy to monopolize the transmigrante forwarding agency industry in the Los Indios, Texas, border region near Harlingen and Brownsville, Texas. The three remaining defendants to the superseding indictment remain at large as fugitives. Transmigrantes are individuals who transport used vehicles and other goods from the United States through Mexico for resale in Central America. Transmigrante forwarding agencies are U.S.-based businesses that provide services to transmigrante clients, including helping those clients complete the customs paperwork required to export vehicles into Mexico.

“The Criminal Division is committed to holding violent criminal organizations accountable in whatever markets in which they operate,” said Matthew R. Galeotti, head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “Transnational criminal organizations that use violence to dominate industries will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.”

“These guilty pleas bring to justice individuals who used violence and extortion to fix prices and monopolize the market for essential services that Americans rely on to earn a living,” said Director of Criminal Enforcement Emma Burnham of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “The Antitrust Division will continue to use every tool at its disposal to protect the public by prosecuting violent criminals – including those who aim to corrupt America’s free markets.”

“Price fixing harms both the public and the business community,” said U.S. Attorney Nicholas J. Ganjei for the Southern District of Texas. “Schemes like this artificially drive up prices, forcing consumers to pay more than they ordinarily would. At its core, such market collusion is nothing more than theft from consumers.”

“These defendants tried to rule through fear, using threats, violence and intimidation to eliminate competition,” said Assistant Director Chad Yarbrough of the FBI Criminal Investigative Division. “Their guilty pleas send a clear message that price fixing and market allocation are serious crimes, and we will hold those accountable who put profits over the law and fair commerce.”

“Today’s pleas reflect the relentlessness of the federal government’s pursuit of transnational criminal organizations that exploit international trade and the U.S. economy,” said Special Agent in Charge Craig Larrabee of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) San Antonio. “This violent scheme was fueled by greed that undermined the safety and economic security of the border region; HSI has prioritized significant resources to protect the U.S. and our legitimate trade.”

According to documents filed in the U.S. District Court in Houston, defendants Carlos Martinez also known as “Cuate,” Pedro Antonio Calvillo Hernandez, Roberto Garcia Villareal, Sandra Guerra Medina, and Mireya Miranda pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to fix prices and allocate the market for transmigrante forwarding agency services in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and one count of conspiracy to monopolize the same market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The conspirators fixed the prices for transmigrante forwarding agency services and created a centralized entity known as the “Pool” to collect and divide revenues among the conspirators, limit competition from other agencies, and increase prices for their services. Market participants who were not part of the conspiracy had to join and pay into the Pool. Pool members enforced the rules of the Pool by monitoring whether forwarding agencies were charging the agreed-upon prices, including by posting prices publicly on social media, and monitoring whether agencies were paying into the Pool as required.

Martinez, Calvillo, Villareal, and Carlos Yzaguirre pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to interfere with commerce by extortion. Martinez also pleaded guilty to one count of interference with commerce by extortion. The defendants conspired to force forwarding agencies to pay money to the Pool and to pay other extortion fees, including a “piso” for every transaction processed in the industry as well as a “fine” for operating in the market outside of Pool rules. The conspirators perpetrated acts of intimidation, coercion, and violence in furtherance of the antitrust and extortion conspiracies. Defendant Martinez was responsible for at least $9.5 million in extortion payments.

Martinez and Jose de Jesus Tapia Fernandez also pleaded guilty to a money laundering conspiracy, through which they laundered extortion proceeds. Cash obtained from the extortion conspiracy was deposited into bank accounts controlled by Martinez and his family, and those deposits were made to conceal and disguise the nature, source, ownership, and control of the proceeds. Juan Hector Ramirez Avila pleaded guilty to one count of structuring a financial transaction to evade reporting requirements.

Martinez agreed to forfeit four real properties and $375,000 in seized U.S. currency, to pay a fine, and to pay full restitution to extortion victims. Guerra, Miranda, Calvillo, and Villareal have also agreed to pay fines as part of their plea agreements.

Rigoberto Brown and Miguel Hipolito Caballero Aupart, and Diego Ceballos-Soto were also charged in the superseding indictment and remain fugitives. Anyone with information about their whereabouts is asked to contact the Antitrust Division’s Complaint Center at 888-647-3258, or visit www.justice.gov/atr/report-violations.

Conspiracies to allocate the market, fix prices, or monopolize in violation of the Sherman Act carry a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment and a maximum $1 million fine for an individual. Conspiracy to interfere with commerce by extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act carries a maximum penalty of 20 years’ imprisonment and a maximum $250,000 fine. Money laundering conspiracy carries a maximum penalty of 20 years’ imprisonment and a maximum $500,000 fine. Structuring a financial transaction to evade reporting requirements carries a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment and a $250,000 fine. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

The Justice Department’s Antitrust Division, the Criminal Division’s Violent Crime and Racketeering Section (VCRS), the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas, HSI, and the FBI are investigating the case.

Trial Attorneys Brittany E. McClure, Anne Veldhuis, and Michael G. Lepage of the Antitrust Division, Trial Attorney Christina Taylor of VCRS, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Alexander L. Alum for the Southern District of Texas are prosecuting the case.

Anyone with information in connection with this investigation should contact the Antitrust Division’s Complaint Center at 888-647-3258, or visit www.justice.gov/atr/report-violations.

Source: US FBI

Cameron Monte Smith, 50, a Canadian citizen, was sentenced today to 150 months in prison per count, to be served consecutively, for two counts of destroying an energy facility — one incident in the District of North Dakota and another in the District of South Dakota.Smith was also ordered to pay $2.1 million in restitution.

According to court documents, on Sept. 11, 2024, Smith pleaded guilty to the two offenses where he admitted to damaging the Wheelock Substation, located near Ray, North Dakota, in an amount exceeding $100,000, in May 2023. The Wheelock substation is operated by Mountrail-Williams Electric Cooperative and Basin Electric Power Cooperative.

Smith also admitted to damaging a transformer and pumpstation of the Keystone Pipeline located near Carpenter, South Dakota, in an amount exceeding $100,000, in July 2022. Smith damaged the Wheelock substation and the Keystone Pipeline equipment by firing multiple rounds from a high-power rifle into the equipment resulting in disruption of electric services to the North Dakota customers and resulting in disruption of the Keystone Pipeline in South Dakota.

Sue Bai, head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division; Acting U.S. Attorney Jennifer Klemetsrud Puhl for the District of North Dakota; U.S. Attorney Alison Ramsdell for the District of South Dakota; and Assistant Director David J. Scott of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division made the announcement.

The FBI investigated the case with valuable assistance from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Williams County (North Dakota) Sheriff’s Office, the South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation, the Clark County (South Dakota) Sheriff’s Department, and the Beadle County (South Dakota) Sheriff’s Department.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys David D. Hagler and Jonathan J. O’Konek for the District of South Dakota, Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeremy Jehangiri for the District of North Dakota, and Trial Attorneys Jacob Warren and Justin Sher of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section prosecuted the case.

Source: US FBI