Source: United States Department of Justice Criminal Division
U.S. Attorney Michael DiGiacomo announced today that Andres Carrillo-Hernandez, 27, a citizen of Mexico, was arrested and charged by criminal complaint with alien smuggling, which carries a mandatory minimum penalty of three years in prison, and a maximum of 10 years.
Source: United States Department of Justice Criminal Division
The Department of Justice announced that Jonathan Andrew Felkel, 34, entered a plea of guilty today before United States District Judge Mary Geiger Lewis for violating the housing rights of his Black neighbor, J.M., in violation of 42 U.S.C. §. 3631.
As the defendant admitted at the plea hearing, on July 17, 2025, Felkel, while driving into the community where both he and J.M. lived, fired a gun and shouted at J.M., “You better keep running, boy!” while J.M. was standing at the community gate. Felkel further admitted that, during the investigation, he told law enforcement officers that he believed Black people were committing crimes in his neighborhood, that he had assumed J.M. was a criminal due to his race, and that he had hoped to convey to J.M. that he should “leave” and “not be around this area.”
“The defendant’s actions were deeply disturbing and completely unacceptable,” said Assistant Attorney General Harmeet K. Dhillon. “We hope his conviction brings a sense of peace to the victim and greater security to Black communities across the country.”
Assistant Attorney General Harmeet K. Dhillon of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division; U.S. Attorney Bryan P. Stirling for the District of South Carolina; and Special Agent in Charge Kevin Moore of the FBI Columbia Field Office made the announcement.
Felkel will be sentenced at a later date. The maximum penalty is 10 years in prison.
The FBI Columbia Field Office and the Richland County Sheriff’s Department investigated the case.
Assistant U.S. Attorneys Elle Klein and Lamar Fyall of the District of South Carolina and Trial Attorney Sarah Armstrong of the Civil Rights Division’s Criminal Section are prosecuting the case.
Source: United States Department of Justice Criminal Division
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA – United States Attorney David I. Courcelle announced that ELVIN LEONARDO OLIVA-RODRIGUEZ (“OLIVIA-RODRIGUEZ”), age 37, a native of Honduras, was indicted on March 13, 2026, for reentry of removed alien, in violation of Title 8, United States Code, Section 1326(a).
Source: United States Department of Justice Criminal Division
Today, an indictment was unsealed charging Yih-Shyan “Wally” Liaw, Ruei-Tsang “Steven” Chang, and Ting-Wei “Willy” Sun, for allegedly conspiring to divert high-performance computer servers assembled in the United States and integrating sophisticated U.S. artificial intelligence technology to China, in violation of U.S. export controls laws. Liaw, a U.S. citizen, and Sun, a citizen of Taiwan, were arrested today and will be presented in the Northern District of California. Chang, a citizen of Taiwan, remains a fugitive.
“The indictment unsealed today details alleged efforts to evade U.S. export laws through false documents, staged dummy servers to mislead inspectors, and convoluted transshipment schemes, in order to obfuscate the true destination of restricted AI technology—China,” said John A. Eisenberg, Assistant Attorney General for National Security. “These chips are the product of American ingenuity, and NSD will continue to enforce our export-control laws to protect that advantage.”
“The FBI’s investigation revealed that Liaw, Chang, and Sun allegedly conspired to sell billions of dollars’ worth of servers integrating sensitive, controlled graphic processing units to buyers in China, in violation of U.S. export control laws,” said Assistant Director Roman Rozhavsky of the FBI’s Counterintelligence and Espionage Division. “Controlling the export of sensitive U.S. artificial intelligence technology is essential to safeguarding our national security and defending the homeland. That’s why combating export violations is among the FBI’s highest priorities, and we will continue working with our law enforcement, private sector, and international partners to bring to justice all who take action to undermine U.S. national security.”
“As alleged in the Indictment, the defendants participated in a systematic scheme to divert massive quantities of servers housing U.S. artificial intelligence technology to customers in China,” said U.S. Attorney Jay Clayton for the Southern District of New York. “They did so through a tangled web of lies, obfuscation, and concealment—all to drive sales and generate revenues in violation of U.S. law. Diversion schemes like those disrupted today generate billions of dollars in ill-gotten gains and pose a direct threat to U.S. national security. Our Office, along with our partners at the FBI and Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, will continue to doggedly investigate these illegal diversion schemes to bring to justice bad actors who aim to profit from illegally exporting U.S. artificial intelligence technology.”
“Yih-Shyan Liaw, Ruei-Tsang Chang, and Ting-Wei Sun allegedly defrauded the United States by diverting hundreds of servers with advanced artificial intelligence capabilities to Chinese customers,” said FBI Assistant Director in Charge James C. Barnacle, Jr of the New York Field Office. “These defendants allegedly fabricated documents, staged bogus equipment to pass audit inventories, and used a pass-through company to conceal their misconduct and true clientele list. The FBI will hold accountable individuals who use American companies to provide export-controlled technology to our adversaries.”
The entirety of the text of the indictment and the descriptions of the indictment constitute only allegations, and every fact described should be treated as an allegation. According to the allegations contained in the indictment unsealed today in Manhattan federal court:
To protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, the U.S. Department of Commerce has implemented license requirements for the export and reexport of artificial intelligence technologies to China and Hong Kong. In particular, the U.S. Department of Commerce has placed restrictions on the export and reexport of items that could make a significant contribution to the military potential or nuclear proliferation of other nations or that could be detrimental to the foreign policy or national security of the United States. For these reasons, among others, advanced artificial intelligence accelerator chips, and servers incorporating such chips, are subject to export license requirements for transfers to China and Hong Kong. Those regulations reflect a formal determination that the computing capabilities in advanced artificial intelligence accelerator hardware are of sufficient strategic significance that their transfer to China poses an unacceptable risk to national security.
Liaw is a co-founder, board member, and Senior Vice President of Business Development of a publicly traded U.S.-based manufacturer that designs and builds high-performance computer servers for artificial intelligence and cloud computing applications (the U.S. Manufacturer), including servers that integrate artificial intelligence graphics processing units (GPUs). Chang is a general manager in the U.S. Manufacturer’s Taiwan office. Sun is a third-party broker and “fixer” who has worked with Liaw, Chang, and others to divert U.S.-export controlled technology to China. Together, the defendants and others conspired to systematically divert the U.S. Manufacturer’s servers with certain GPUs to China without a license to do so from the U.S. Department of Commerce.
The scheme operated as follows. Liaw and Chang, who worked closely with third-party brokers with customers based in China, directed certain executives of a company based in Southeast Asia (“Company-1”) to place purchase orders with the U.S. Manufacturer for servers with certain GPUs, purportedly for Company-1. Those servers were often assembled in the United States and shipped to the U.S. Manufacturer’s facilities in Taiwan, then delivered to Company-1 elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Company-1, in consultation with the defendants, then used a shipping and logistics company to repackage the U.S. Manufacturer’s servers and place them in unmarked boxes to conceal their content prior to shipping them to their final destinations in China. To ensure that these server allocations were approved internally at the U.S. Manufacturer, the defendants and executives at Company-1 prepared false documents and records, and transmitted false communications, purporting to show that Company-1 was the end user of the servers.
At the defendants’ direction, between 2024 and 2025, Company-1 purchased approximately $2.5 billion worth of servers from the U.S. Manufacturer, many of which were assembled in the United States. The defendants’ scheme became more brazen over time and resulted in massive quantities of servers with controlled U.S. artificial intelligence technology being sent to China. Between late April 2025 and mid-May 2025 alone, at least approximately $510 million worth of the U.S. Manufacturer’s servers, assembled in the United States, were diverted to China in violation of U.S. export control laws as part of the defendants’ scheme.
The defendants and their co-conspirators took extensive measures to conceal their scheme. As just one example, to deceive the U.S. Manufacturer’s compliance team, responsible for ensuring adherence to U.S. export control laws, the defendants staged thousands of “dummy” servers—non-working, physical replicas of the U.S. Manufacturer’s servers—for inspection at the locations where Company-1 was purportedly storing the servers it had purchased from the U.S. Manufacturer. However, the actual servers purchased by Company-1 from the U.S. Manufacturer had already been unlawfully shipped to China. Photographs of some of the dummy servers that were staged at a warehouse rented by Company-1 in connection with an August 2025 audit conducted by the U.S. Manufacturer are below:Today, an indictment was unsealed charging Yih-Shyan “Wally” Liaw, Ruei-Tsang “Steven” Chang, and Ting-Wei “Willy” Sun, for allegedly conspiring to divert high-performance computer servers assembled in the United States and integrating sophisticated U.S. artificial intelligence technology to China, in violation of U.S. export controls laws. Liaw, a U.S. citizen, and Sun, a citizen of Taiwan, were arrested today and will be presented in the Northern District of California. Chang, a citizen of Taiwan, remains a fugitive.
“The indictment unsealed today details alleged efforts to evade U.S. export laws through false documents, staged photographs to mislead inspectors, and convoluted transshipment schemes, in order to obfuscate the true destination of restricted AI technology—China,” said John A. Eisenberg, Assistant Attorney General for National Security. “These chips are the product of American ingenuity, and NSD will continue to enforce our export-control laws to protect that advantage.”
“The FBI’s investigation revealed that Liaw, Chang, and Sun allegedly conspired to sell billions of dollars’ worth of servers integrating sensitive, controlled graphic processing units to buyers in China, in violation of U.S. export control laws,” said Assistant Director Roman Rozhavsky of the FBI’s Counterintelligence and Espionage Division. “Controlling the export of sensitive U.S. artificial intelligence technology is essential to safeguarding our national security and defending the homeland. That’s why combating export violations is among the FBI’s highest priorities, and we will continue working with our law enforcement, private sector, and international partners to bring to justice all who take action to undermine U.S. national security.”
“As alleged in the Indictment, the defendants participated in a systematic scheme to divert massive quantities of servers housing U.S. artificial intelligence technology to customers in China,” said U.S. Attorney Jay Clayton for the Southern District of New York. “They did so through a tangled web of lies, obfuscation, and concealment—all to drive sales and generate revenues in violation of U.S. law. Diversion schemes like those disrupted today generate billions of dollars in ill-gotten gains and pose a direct threat to U.S. national security. Our Office, along with our partners at the FBI and Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, will continue to doggedly investigate these illegal diversion schemes to bring to justice bad actors who aim to profit from illegally exporting U.S. artificial intelligence technology.”
“Yih-Shyan Liaw, Ruei-Tsang Chang, and Ting-Wei Sun allegedly defrauded the United States by diverting hundreds of servers with advanced artificial intelligence capabilities to Chinese customers,” said FBI Assistant Director in Charge James C. Barnacle, Jr of the New York Field Office. “These defendants allegedly fabricated documents, staged bogus equipment to pass audit inventories, and used a pass-through company to conceal their misconduct and true clientele list. The FBI will hold accountable individuals who use American companies to provide export-controlled technology to our adversaries.”
The entirety of the text of the indictment and the descriptions of the indictment constitute only allegations, and every fact described should be treated as an allegation. According to the allegations contained in the indictment unsealed today in Manhattan federal court:
To protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, the U.S. Department of Commerce has implemented license requirements for the export and reexport of artificial intelligence technologies to China and Hong Kong. In particular, the U.S. Department of Commerce has placed restrictions on the export and reexport of items that could make a significant contribution to the military potential or nuclear proliferation of other nations or that could be detrimental to the foreign policy or national security of the United States. For these reasons, among others, advanced artificial intelligence accelerator chips, and servers incorporating such chips, are subject to export license requirements for transfers to China and Hong Kong. Those regulations reflect a formal determination that the computing capabilities in advanced artificial intelligence accelerator hardware are of sufficient strategic significance that their transfer to China poses an unacceptable risk to national security.
Liaw is a co-founder, board member, and Senior Vice President of Business Development of a publicly traded U.S.-based manufacturer that designs and builds high-performance computer servers for artificial intelligence and cloud computing applications (the U.S. Manufacturer), including servers that integrate artificial intelligence graphics processing units (GPUs). Chang is a general manager in the U.S. Manufacturer’s Taiwan office. Sun is a third-party broker and “fixer” who has worked with Liaw, Chang, and others to divert U.S.-export controlled technology to China. Together, the defendants and others conspired to systematically divert the U.S. Manufacturer’s servers with certain GPUs to China without a license to do so from the U.S. Department of Commerce.
The scheme operated as follows. Liaw and Chang, who worked closely with third-party brokers with customers based in China, directed certain executives of a company based in Southeast Asia (“Company-1”) to place purchase orders with the U.S. Manufacturer for servers with certain GPUs, purportedly for Company-1. Those servers were often assembled in the United States and shipped to the U.S. Manufacturer’s facilities in Taiwan, then delivered to Company-1 elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Company-1, in consultation with the defendants, then used a shipping and logistics company to repackage the U.S. Manufacturer’s servers and place them in unmarked boxes to conceal their content prior to shipping them to their final destinations in China. To ensure that these server allocations were approved internally at the U.S. Manufacturer, the defendants and executives at Company-1 prepared false documents and records, and transmitted false communications, purporting to show that Company-1 was the end user of the servers.
At the defendants’ direction, between 2024 and 2025, Company-1 purchased approximately $2.5 billion worth of servers from the U.S. Manufacturer, many of which were assembled in the United States. The defendants’ scheme became more brazen over time and resulted in massive quantities of servers with controlled U.S. artificial intelligence technology being sent to China. Between late April 2025 and mid-May 2025 alone, at least approximately $510 million worth of the U.S. Manufacturer’s servers, assembled in the United States, were diverted to China in violation of U.S. export control laws as part of the defendants’ scheme.
The defendants and their co-conspirators took extensive measures to conceal their scheme. As just one example, to deceive the U.S. Manufacturer’s compliance team, responsible for ensuring adherence to U.S. export control laws, the defendants staged thousands of “dummy” servers—non-working, physical replicas of the U.S. Manufacturer’s servers—for inspection at the locations where Company-1 was purportedly storing the servers it had purchased from the U.S. Manufacturer. However, the actual servers purchased by Company-1 from the U.S. Manufacturer had already been unlawfully shipped to China. Photographs of some of the dummy servers that were staged at a warehouse rented by Company-1 in connection with an August 2025 audit conducted by the U.S. Manufacturer are below:
Some of those same dummy servers were also later staged at a warehouse rented by Company-1 in an attempt to pass an inspection being conducted by the U.S. Department of Commerce of Company-1’s purchases of the U.S. Manufacturer’s servers. In advance of the inspection, SUN and one of the third-party brokers who works closely with the defendants to divert servers to China (“Broker-1”) staged dummy servers at the warehouse by, among other things, unboxing the dummy servers; using a hair dryer to remove and affix labels and serial number stickers to the server boxes and to the dummy servers themselves; and then re-packaging the dummy servers in the U.S. Manufacturer’s boxes. Surveillance cameras recorded their work and captured them preparing the dummy servers, including as shown in the images below, Sun (top) and Broker-1 (bottom):
Throughout the scheme, the defendants coordinated closely with each other, executives of Company-1, and third-party brokers with end customers in China using encrypted messaging applications. Those communications related to, among other topics, the quantities of servers for Company-1 to order, the locations in China where those servers were to be shipped, and efforts to conceal the nature of the scheme from the U.S. Manufacturer’s compliance team, U.S. authorities, and others. At no point did the defendants or the U.S. Manufacturer have a license from the U.S. Department of Commerce to export or reexport U.S.-manufactured servers to China.
Liaw, 71, of Fremont, California; Chang, 53, of Taiwan; and Sun, 44, of Taiwan, are each charged with one count of conspiring to violate the Export Controls Reform Act, which carries a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years, one count of conspiring to smuggle goods from the United States, which carries a maximum term of imprisonment of 5 years, and one count of conspiring to defraud the United States, which carries a maximum term of imprisonment of 5 years.
The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendants will be determined by a judge.
The FBI, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, and the Department of Justice’s National Security Division, Counterintelligence and Export Control Section investigated the case.
This case is being handled by the Southern District of New York’s National Security and International Narcotics Unit and Securities and Commodities Fraud Task Force and by the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section. The case is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys Juliana N. Murray, David J. Robles, and Kevin T. Sullivan for the Southern District of New York and Trial Attorneys Maria Fedor and Mark Murphy of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section.
The charges contained in the Indictment are merely accusations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
Source: United States Department of Justice Criminal Division
A Court-Authorized Domain Seizure Removes Four Websites Facilitating the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security’s Hacking Efforts Tied to Psychological Operations and Transnational Repression
The Justice Department announced the seizure of four domains as part of an ongoing effort to disrupt hacking and transnational repression schemes conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). The affidavit supporting the seizure warrant can be found here. The seized domains – Justicehomeland[.]org, Handala-Hack[.]to, Karmabelow80[.]org, and Handala-Redwanted[.]to – were used by the MOIS in furtherance of attempted psychological operations targeting adversaries of the regime by claiming credit for hacking activity, posting sensitive data stolen during such hacks, and calling for the killing of journalists, regime dissidents, and Israeli persons. For example, the MOIS used the Handala-hack[.]to domain to claim credit for a March 2026 destructive malware attack against a U.S.-based multinational medical technologies firm.
“Terrorist propaganda online can incite real-world violence — thanks to our National Security Division and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Maryland, this network of Iranian-backed sites will no longer broadcast anti-American hate,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “Our cyber assets will remain ever-vigilant to root out and deactivate networks that pose a threat to American citizens.”
“Iran thought they could hide behind fake websites and keyboard threats to terrorize Americans and silence dissidents,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “We took down four of their operation’s pillars and we’re not done. This FBI will hunt down every actor behind these cowardly death threats and cyberattacks and will bring the full force of American law enforcement down on them.”
“Iran, the leading state sponsor of terrorism worldwide, used the seized domains to dox and harass dissidents and journalists, incite violence against Jewish communities, and spread Tehran’s anti-American propaganda,” said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John A. Eisenberg. “NSD is committed to dismantling Iran’s cyberwarfare infrastructure and detecting and preventing Iran’s cyber-enabled terrorism.”
“Unleashing terroristic ideology into the cybersphere is a direct threat to our national security. The U.S. Attorney’s Office is committed to collaborating with our law-enforcement partners to identify threats, shut them down, and hold bad actors accountable,” said Kelly O. Hayes, U.S. Attorney for the District of Maryland. “We will not hesitate to use all our resources and available tools to do whatever is necessary to ensure the safety and security of our nation.”
“The Iranian regime exploits cyberspace to advance authoritarian objectives, suppress democratic institutions, and undermine our national and economic security,” said FBI Baltimore Special Agent in Charge Jimmy Paul. “The FBI will act swiftly, deliberately, and proactively to disable cyber threats to America and use every available authority to ensure those responsible are identified, apprehended, and held accountable.”
The FBI’s investigation revealed that the four seized domains were linked to each other through shared leak sites, Iranian IP ranges, and a common operational “playbook.” That playbook includes: destructive and disruptive cyber-attacks; and “faketivist” psychological operations using data stolen via hacking.
The Domains handala-hack[.]to and handala-redwanted[.]to
As alleged in court documents, after the U.S.-Iran conflict began on February 28, 2026, the MOIS-controlled domains handala-hack[.]to and handala-redwanted[.]to published personally identifiable information (“PII”) associated with targeted individuals. The domain handala-hack[.]to also claimed responsibility for hacks conducted by the group. Specifically:
These threats and the related information were not just publicly posted. The FBI’s investigation also revealed that the email account Handala_Team@outlook[.]com was used to send death threats to Iranian dissidents and journalists living in the United States and abroad. In those communications, Handala Hack offered bounties and openly called for Mexican cartel “partners” to commit acts of violence against Handala Hack’s targets. Specifically, on or about March 1, 2026, the Handala_Team@outlook[.]com account was used to email two victims, located in the United States and abroad. In an email with the subject line “Death to [redacted victim names],” the sender wrote:
“We the Handala Hack team, the loyal followers of the supreme leader Ali Hosseini Khamenei, declare war on all the enemies of Islam in the West. Our partners, the CJNG [Jalisco New Generation Cartel] cartel in America and Canada have been given a list of our enemies who are responsible for our great leaders [sic] death. [Redacted names], you laughed like hyenas during the [redacted] show. We have hacked and revealed your home addresses in [redacted] and [redacted] to our partners in the CJNG who are in [redacted U.S. state] and [redacted foreign country] now. Both of you will be executed soon, and we have offered a reward of $250,000 for the operatives who kills [sic] and beheads both of you. ALLAHU AKBAR[.]”
The domain handala-hack[.]to was also used as part of a broader effort to intimidate and harass Iranian dissidents and journalists living in the United States and abroad. According to investigators, threat actors associated with the domain directed online threats toward individuals who publicly criticized the Iranian government. In those cases, the MOIS attempts to embarrass and discredit its targets by circulating messages and content intended to damage their reputation. By leveraging online platforms linked to the domain, MOIS sought to amplify its online threats, pressure critics, and discourage independent reporting, while creating fear among members of the Iranian diaspora critical of the regime.
The Domains Justicehomeland[.]org and Karmabelow80[.]org
The domains Justicehomeland[.]org and Karmabelow80[.]org were the official websites of a shell hacktivist entity used by MOIS. On or about July 15, 2022, and September 9, 2022, MOIS actors used the Justicehomeland[.]org domain to claim responsibility for stealing sensitive documents from Albanian government organizations. The motivation for leaking this information appears to be the Albanian government’s decision to support an Iranian dissident group called Mujahedeen e-Khalq or “MEK.” MEK has, in the past, openly advocated for the overthrow of the Iranian government.
In addition to these enforcement actions, the Department of State’s Rewards for Justice program is offering a reward of up to $10 million for information on any person who, while acting at the direction or under the control of a foreign government, engages in certain malicious cyber activities against U.S. critical infrastructure in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse. Read more about this reward offer on the Rewards for Justice website.
The FBI Baltimore Field Office is investigating the case, in coordination with FBI Cyber Division.
The United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Maryland and the National Security Division’s National Security Cyber Section are prosecuting the case.
Source: United States Department of Justice Criminal Division
LAS VEGAS – Three Mexican nationals and one Honduran national were all sentenced this week by United States District Judge Gloria Navarro to terms of imprisonment followed by terms of supervised release for illegally reentering the United States after being removed on a combined 14 prior occasions from the United States.
Source: United States Department of Justice Criminal Division
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA –TERRENCE THOMPSON, JR. (“THOMPSON”), age 24, of New Orleans, was sentenced on March 18, 2026, after previously pleading guilty to Unlawful Possession and Use of a United States Postal Service “arrow” key used by Postal Service employees to access authorized mail receptacles, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1704, and Theft of approximately 232 pieces of United States Mail that had been deposited into authorized mail receptacles, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1708, announced U.S. Attorney David I. Courcelle.
Source: United States Department of Justice Criminal Division
DENVER – The United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Colorado announces Nathan James Meek, 43, Colorado Springs, was sentenced to 300 months in federal prison after being found guilty on multiple counts including: one count of possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, one count of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, one count of possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon, conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking.
Source: United States Department of Justice Criminal Division
Maurice Tutt, 52, of the District of Columbia., was sentenced today in U.S. District Court to 20 months in federal prison for his role in a wide-ranging conspiracy to distribute fentanyl, cocaine base, cocaine, and methamphetamine, centered in the Potomac Gardens Housing Project in Southeast Washington.
Source: United States Department of Justice Criminal Division
A federal grand jury returned an indictment today, against Kenyin McGee, 27, of Oakland, charging him with sex trafficking of a minor and sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion for compelling a 17-year-old girl to engage in commercial sex acts.